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Synonyms 
potentiality, tendency, power, capacity 
 
 
Definition 
Dispositions are properties that need enabling conditions for being manifest. 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
(1) Dispositional vs. categorical properties 
Properties of objects or systems (system, complex) are usually distinguished into 
dispositional properties and categorical properties. Everyday paradigm cases of 
dispositional properties are, for instance, courage and fragility; paradigm cases of 
categorical properties are shape and structure of an object or a system. Whether it is 
possible to explicitly define individual dispositions (and to provide a general 
definitional scheme for ‘disposition’ as a generic term) is a major dispute in the 
debate about dispositions (see sect. 3).  
In the case of dispositional properties it is important to distinguish between an 
object or system having a property on the one hand and manifesting the property 
under enabling conditions on the other. A person may be a courageous person all 
his life but has only few occasions to show courageous behavior. Similarly, a glass 
may be fragile but this disposition will become manifest (i.e. the glass will break) only 
if given certain enabling or stimulus conditions obtain (e.g. striking of the glass). On 
the contrary, if objects or systems possess categorical properties (e.g. the roundness 
of a billiard ball) they will be manifest unconditionally. Thus, concepts for categorical 
properties do not entail the distinction of having the property and manifesting it.  
Many examples of dispositional properties can be found in the biological 
sciences. The capacity of amino acid chains to fold into a specific three-dimensional 
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structure, the capacity of genes to become activated, the ability of muscle fibers to 
contract, the pluripotency and totipotency of cells, the fitness (capacity to reproduce 
successfully and survive) of organisms, the evolvability/adaptability of populations, 
and the sustainability of ecosystems are just a few of several examples which could 
be mentioned here. 
 
(2) The importance of dispositions for science 
Dispositions have been controversial since early modern times because they were 
conceived of as hidden causes (causality) that bring about effects (their 
manifestations). Moliére in his Le Malade imaginaire ridicules explanations 
(explanation, biological) in terms of dispositions by pointing out that one might 
explain why opium puts people to sleep by appealing to its ‘dormitive virtue’. 
However, it is explanatory empty to refer to hidden causes that are epistemically 
accessible only via a single effect.  
However, since the 1930s (Carnap 1936) it became apparent that 
dispositional concepts do play an important role in science and furthermore interest 
in dispositions as an analytical tool for characterizing science has resurged 
considerably in the last two decades (Mellor 2000, Fara 2006). The concept of a 
disposition is an important tool in the analysis of science because it points to the fact 
that the properties/behavior of systems may only be manifest given certain enabling 
or stimulus conditions, e.g. contextual factors. This is particularly true in the 
biological sciences. We attribute many properties to biological systems (e.g. the 
ability of muscle fibers to contract) that become manifest only given the presence of 
specific enabling conditions (e.g. the presence of ATP and an appropriate stimulus). 
 
(3) Conditional Analysis 
Certain aspects of dispositions have been debated (see Mumford 1998 for a 
comprehensive overview). We will discuss some of these issues in order to clarify 
what is implied by the attribution of a disposition to an object or a system (system, 
complex).  
First, what are the conditions under which we can legitimately attribute a 
disposition D to a system s? To give a precise answer to this question requires 
specifying the relation between having a disposition and manifesting it. One major 
issue in the debate about dispositions is whether this connection can be made more 
precise – whether particular dispositions can be defined explicitly in terms of their 
manifestations and enabling conditions. 
The starting point for such attempts is the so-called simple conditional 
analysis. Let Ds stand for system s having the disposition D, that is, s being 
disposed to M (manifestation) provided enabling conditions E obtain. According to 
the simple conditional analysis (SCA) the necessary and sufficient conditions for s 
having D can be symbolized as follows: 
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SCA: Ds ↔ (Es → Ms) 
 
which is to be read as: s has Disposition D if and only if: If s were confronted with E 
then s would necessarily manifest M. Thus, given SCA and given we know how to 
test the counterfactual claim “Es → Ms” we know under which conditions we can 
legitimately attribute D to s. 
One problem with the SCA is that manifestations cannot easily be specified. 
What exactly are the manifestations of being courageous or of fragility (cf. Prior 
1985, 6-10)? Likewise, it is difficult to spell out the exact enabling conditions for a 
disposition (e.g. breaking, hitting, and throwing in particular ways). This is even truer 
for biological dispositions because the way in which the context is involved in the 
manifestation is diverse and complicated, and the enabling conditions are very 
complex. 
Another significant problem for the simple conditional analysis is a family of 
counterexamples that shows that the right hand side of SCA (Es → Ms) is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the left hand side (Ds). There are various such 
counterexamples discussed under the headings of ‘antidotes’, ‘finks’, ‘masks’ etc. 
For example, if we understand ‘fatally poisonous’ as ‘disposed to kill if ingested’. 
Someone might take the poison but nevertheless survive because of some antidote 
that has been ingested as well (Bird 2007, 27). In such a case the substance is 
fatally poisonous but the manifestation does not take place even though the enabling 
conditions (ingestion) did occur. A fortiori the right hand side of SCA is not a 
necessary condition for the left hand side. There are possible interferences, which 
invalidate SCA. Thus, the manifestation of a disposition requires not only enabling 
conditions but also the absence of interfering factors. Only if all of these conditions 
can be listed explicitly, the SCA would provide an explicit definition of a dispositional 
concept. It is, however, a controversial issue whether it is even in principle possible 
to list all relevant factors. Take the example of the differentiability of cells. The 
process of manifestation, that is, the differentiation of a cell into a specific cell type is 
a very complex and temporally extended process, which requires that many genes 
are correctly activated or repressed, that plenty of proteins are properly synthesized 
and interact in the right way with each other. According to the complexity of the 
differentiation process numerous factors could disturb this process and prevent the 
manifestation. It is hardly imaginable that one could (even in principle) prepare a 
complete list of all possible interfering factors. 
 
(4) Intrinsicality 
A second instructive debate concerns the intrinsicality of dispositions. Roughly 
speaking, a property is intrinsic if a system possesses the property independently of 
what is going on in its context. Shape is an intrinsic property, whereas being smaller 
than everybody else in the room is an extrinsic (relational) property. 
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The rationale for attributing a disposition to a particular system seems to imply 
that dispositions are intrinsic. The rationale is as follows: The phenomenon of sugar 
dissolving in water is - strictly speaking - a property of a combined system – sugar 
plus water. If we describe the phenomenon in terms of a disposition being manifest 
rather than in terms of a property of a compound system, we usually introduce a 
distinction between a system (e.g. sugar), which is endowed with a disposition, and 
external, e.g., contextual conditions. If we ascribe solubility to sugar then we focus 
on those conditions for the obtaining of the phenomenon that are due to the sugar 
only. The disposition (solubility) comprises exactly those conditions of the 
phenomenon that the system (sugar) possesses independently of what is going on in 
the context. Thus, even though the manifestation of dispositions (e.g. the dissolving 
in the case of solubility) depends on extrinsic factors it is usually held that the 
disposition itself (e.g. the solubility of salt) is intrinsic. But intrinsicality may not be a 
necessary feature of dispositions (cf. McKitrick 2003; Fara 2006, sect. 4). The 
challenge is particularly clear in the case of some biological systems: The 
importance of the context undermines the claim that all dispositional properties are 
intrinsic. As Alan Love (2003) has pointed out for the example of the evolvability of 
populations (adaptation), in many cases external factors are not only the enabling 
conditions for biological dispositions. Rather, they determine jointly with intrinsic 
factors the very nature of the disposition as well as its causal efficacy. For example, 
whether a population is evolvable or not is not independent of contextual factors like 
migratory abilities and landscape topography. Hence, the intrinsic character of the 
biological disposition ‘evolvability’ is called into question. 
 
(5) Single-track vs. multi-track dispositions 
Courage, it seems, is a disposition that will be manifested in different situations by 
different behavior. It is a multi-track disposition; that is one disposition with multiple 
possible manifestations. However, the SCA-tradition has often assumed that 
dispositions are individuated in terms of one set of enabling conditions and one 
manifestation (single-track dispositions). The drawback is a proliferation of 
dispositions, e.g. different courage-dispositions – one for each kind of courageous 
behavior, e.g. courage in the face of death and courage in the face of financial 
stress. 
In biology there are many possible candidates for multi-track dispositions: The 
manifestation of evolvability for a population can result in different changes of gene 
frequency of a population; the pluripotency of stem cells can become manifest in 
muscle cells, bone cells etc. But on closer inspection it becomes apparent that the 
characterization of these dispositions as ‘multi-track’ depends on a fine grained 
analysis of the manifestation states. If we raise the graininess of the analysis, just 
one and not multiple possible manifestation states can be identified. For example, 
the evolvability of a population will be manifest if its gene frequency has changed 
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independent of the kind of gene whose frequency has changed and independent of 
the exact dimension of the change. 
 
(6) Reduction 
A further frequently disputed question concerns the issue of reduction. Dispositions 
such as fragility are necessary conditions for the obtaining of the manifestation 
(provided the simple conditional analysis or something akin is correct). This is often 
analyzed as: Fragility is causally efficacious (causality) in bringing about the 
manifestation. An ensuing question that has been widely discussed is whether a 
disposition can be considered causally efficacious on its own or whether it is causally 
efficacious in virtue of an underlying causal basis, such as molecular structure.  
It is important to distinguish two issues in this debate. First, fragility and other 
every-day dispositions are macroscopic properties. We tend to assume that 
macroscopic properties of systems can be reduced to their molecular structure. A 
glass for, instance, is fragile in virtue of its molecular structure. This, however, is true 
for dispositional and categorical properties alike. The glass has its shape (a 
categorical property) in virtue of its molecular structure (and/or arrangement) as well. 
So this is not special issue for dispositions.  
A second, different, issue is whether there can be bare dispositions or 
whether every dispositional property needs to be reduced to categorical properties, 
such as the micro-structural configuration. The question is whether there might be 
irreducible dispositional properties that cannot be identified with a set of categorical 
(e.g.) micro-structural properties. The physical property ‘charge’ or other 
fundamental dispositions might be candidates for bare dispositions because there 
are no micro-structural properties that they might be identified with. 
 
 
Cross-references 
adaptation; causality; complexity; explanation, biological; reduction; system, complex 
 
enabling conditions; evolvabililty; intrinsicality; manifestation; Simple Conditional 
Analysis (SCA) 
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